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Spanish Nationalism: Ethnic or Civic?  
 
“Dios mío, ¿Qué es España?” 
José Ortega y Gasset
i
 
 
Spanish political life is often marked by an exchange of attacks between 
Spanish and peripheral nationalisms. While the existence of peripheral nationalisms is 
widely acknowledged, Spanish nationalism is constantly denied by the political 
spectrum. This is often the case for most state nationalisms but it is remarkable in the 
case of Spanish nationalism. In Spain, the amount of research devoted to the study of 
peripheral nationalisms dwarfs that dedicated to Spanish nationalism. It was not until 
two renowned historians, Juan Pablo Fusi and Borja de Riquer, presented their 
opposing views in the pages of the journal Historia Social in the early 1990s that 
Spanish nationalism became a recurrent subject of academic enquiry.
ii 
Even though 
both historians agreed on the weakness of the Spanish state-building process in the 
nineteenth century, they differed on the level of resonance of Spanish nationalism vis 
a vis peripheral nationalisms. Further analyses of Spanish nationalism have 
challenged the idea of the precarious nationalisation of the masses by the state and 
presented the persistence of regionalism as compatible with the creation of a Spanish 
national identity (Archilés & Martí, 2001; Segarra i Estarelles, 2001). All these 
studies have approached the topic from an “instrumentalist” perspective, depicting 
Spanish nationalism primarily as an instrument of socio-economic development or 
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state-building. These explanations offer a good insight into the aims of political elites 
and the manipulative capacity of nationalist ideology, but they usually say little about 
nationalist rhetoric and its powerful appeal to the population. 
The present work aims to advance a different line of enquiry that focuses not 
so much on the state-building process, but on nationalist discourse and the top-down 
and bottom-up „construction‟ of the nation as an imagined community. As 
exemplified in Anderson‟s Imagined Communities, the „constructivist‟ approach 
stresses the creative and changing character of national identity, together with its 
adaptability to diverse political contexts in time and space.  In our case study, the 
changing nature of Spanish nationalism is understood in terms of a process of 
historical transformation, in which different conceptions of the nation were elaborated 
in diverse political contexts throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By 
exploring the civic and ethnic elements that define the Spanish nation in the 
nationalist discourse, it is possible to analyse the changing character of national 
identity and differentiate between assorted traditions in Spanish nationalism. 
 
 
Ethnic and Civic Nationalism 
 
Before turning to the character of Spanish nationalism, this paper briefly 
explores the meaning of the terms „ethnic‟ and „civic‟ in the literature on nationalism. 
The first contemporary scholars to distinguish between two kinds of nationalisms 
were the historians Friedrich Meinecke (1907), Hans Kohn (1944) and John 
Plamenatz (1976). From a German perspective, Meinecke differentiated between 
„cultural nations‟ based on ‟some jointly experienced cultural heritage‟, and „political 
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nations‟ based on the „unifying force of a common political history and constitution‟ 
(Meinecke, 1907). On the other hand, Kohn and Plamenatz used different concepts of 
nationhood to geographical areas and distinguished between „Eastern‟ and „Western‟ 
nationalisms. For Kohn, the dividing line between Eastern and Western nationalisms 
was the river Rhine. To the east of the Rhine, an organic, deterministic variety of 
nationalism developed in clear contrast to the Western rational and voluntaristic 
variety. In a similar line, Plamenatz argued that nationalism of the Eastern kind was 
„illiberal‟, „backward‟, „imitative‟ and „competitive‟ while the Western variety was 
„culturally better equipped‟ for „success and excellence‟ (Plamenatz, 1976). The 
works of Meinecke, Kohn and Plamenatz paved the way for a series of scholarly 
works that developed further the ethnic-civic divide and set the tone of the academic 
debate: ethnic nationalism was associated with exclusion, xenophobia and violence; 
while „civic nations‟ were associated with liberal regimes capable of integrating 
newcomers and providing universal and humanistic values.  
More recently, the ethnic-civic divide has been reformulated, regaining its 
utility as an analytical tool (Brubaker, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992). It is precisely in the 
changing emphasis on political or cultural factors made by the nationalist discourse 
where scholars have drawn a line between „civic‟ and „ethnic‟ nationalism. Anthony 
Smith, for instance, describes two ideal concepts of nations (Smith, 1994). Firstly, the 
„civic‟ conception considers the nation as a community of destiny defined by a 
common body of law, which applies to all citizens and is in turn the origin of all 
legislation. Civic nationalism is also characterised by its will to impose a public 
culture and a „civic religion‟, based on a common language, via mass education. 
Republican France can be considered the most successful model of civic nation. 
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Secondly, nations can also be created out of pre-existing ethnies. Ethnic 
nationalism emphasises the distinctive racial, linguistic, religious or cultural factors of 
the original ethnie and aims to return to its „Golden Age‟. Unlike its „civic‟ 
counterpart, the ethnic nation is not defined in terms of political rights but on cultural 
principles. The romantic conception of Germany developed by Fichte at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century provides a good example of an ethnic nation. 
Finally, it is possible to identify both models of nations within the borders of 
the same nation-state and cultural community. In these instances, a civic model of 
nation confronts the ethnic version of the same nation. The case of France during the 
Dreyfus affair, when the liberal-democratic canon openly clashed with the vernacular 
and clerical model defended by the traditionalists, is a clear illustration of competing 
models of nations within the same state. Moreover, ethnic and civic elements usually 
coexist in the same nationalist discourse. As Anthony D. Smith has argued, the 
different conceptions of the nation are „closely intertwined‟ and tend „to move from 
one version to another as circumstances dictate‟ (Smith, 1998).  
Contrary to some monolithic views, the following pages illustrate that Spanish 
nationalism has not remained static and homogenous throughout its two centuries of 
existence.
iii
 It has rather changed and evolved throughout time, incorporating both 
ethnic and civic elements in the discursive formation/„creation‟ of the Spanish nation. 
Two main canons of the Spanish nation can be detected in the nineteenth century: 
liberal and traditionalist. The liberal canon is usually associated to civic nationalism, 
while the traditionalist is described as ethnic. Nevertheless, it is argued here that 
throughout the twentieth century these two traditions coexisted and were constantly 
re-elaborated, emphasising ethnic and civic features and diverse alternatives for the 
state territorial organisation, as political circumstances dictated. This changing 
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character of Spanish nationalism in the last century can be better understood 
following a „double dialectic of confrontation‟ at the discursive level. On the one 
hand, we analyse the interaction in the creation and development of the opposed 
concepts of Spain defended by liberals and traditionalists. On the other hand, the 
confrontational dialogue that both liberals and traditionalists maintained with the 
peripheral nationalisms of Catalonia and the Basque Country, forced the former to 
reshape their own definition of the fatherland, showing the ethnic-civic fluctuation in 
the nature of Spanish nationalism.  
 
 
The Creation of the Modern Nation, 1808-1898 
 
In Spain, the co-existence of a „civic‟ and an „ethnic‟ concept of the nation can 
be traced back to the first decades of the nineteenth century, when the liberal and the 
traditionalist models of Spain were first formulated (Fox, 1997).  
The modern liberal concept of Spain was created during the Peninsular War 
(1808-1814). The invasion of Napoleonic troops mobilised an important sector of the 
population in the struggle against the French and triggered the liberal revolution, 
which resulted in the approval of the first Spanish constitutional text. In March 1812 
the National Assembly, Cortes Generales, passed a constitution which established the 
„Spanish nation‟ as the utter sovereign and recognized Spain as a national, 
constitutional, parliamentarian and Catholic body. If the 1812 Constitution gave legal 
shape to the liberal concept of the Spanish nation, wartime also showed the „invention 
of traditions‟ to justify abandoning the absolutist regime. Liberals recreated a 
medieval popular inheritance in order to define the national community in terms of a 
common history and culture (Riquer 1994). Thus Aragon‟s medieval parliaments and 
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the Castilian Comuneros‟ opposition to Habsburg rule were highlighted as historical 
episodes which illustrated the pre-modern origins of Spanish liberalism. In turn, this 
new celebration of „popular‟ and „democratic‟ institutions justified the liberal political 
view, which held that new participatory bodies be created within a modern state. In 
other words, the liberal idea of Spain was essentially civic but since the very 
beginning it also incorporated an important ethnic perception of the nation as a 
community shaped by history and culture (Nuñez, 1999). 
During the Isabeline era (1833-1868) moderate liberals in power elaborated a 
nationalist mythology following the canons established in Cádiz. The fight against the 
French was then named the „War of Independence‟ and became the pillar of national 
myth making. Hundreds of monuments were erected to commemorate the struggle‟s 
martyrs and the 2
nd
 of May was converted into a national holiday. Moreover, the 
„people‟ became the main character in literature and academic books, which 
underlined the historical continuity of the Spanish Volkgeist (Jover, 1984). The 
practical goal of this production of general histories of Spain was to legitimise the 
construction of the liberal state and contemporary bourgeois social values. The 
underlying idea was that from history one could grasp the „nation‟s spirit‟, as the 
result of its unique history, culture and geography „from which derived a set of moral 
prescriptions for individual and collective life‟ (Álvarez Junco, 1996). At the political 
level, moderate discourse defended a uniform centralized state as the best way to 
cement the liberal order, while maintaining an ethnic identification between 
Catholicism and Spanish national identity. 
A more civic alternative to the moderate canon of Spain came from 
progressive liberals and Republicans. They interpreted the medieval Cortes, fueros 
(local rights) and religious tolerance as the hallmarks of the Spanish nation‟s Golden 
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Age. Conversely, Habsburg rule, „foreign‟ absolutism, and religious intolerance had 
paved the way for Spanish decadence. Finally, freedom, democracy, and, in some 
versions, republicanism were the redemptive ideals of the liberal-progressive model 
(Álvarez Junco, 1996). Unlike the Moderates, progressive liberals supported the 
construction of a decentralized state. They justified this political position by idealizing 
the medieval local statutes and municipalities, as the „historical protectors‟ of so-
called „regional freedoms‟ (Nuñez, 1999). Consequently, when advocating a 
decentralized state, democrats also claimed to be preserving the „traditional‟ political 
structure of the nation. But ideological intentions and political realities proved 
difficult to marry. When progressive liberals were in power (1868-1874) the political 
system remained highly unstable and the federal experience during the First Republic 
(1873-1874) could never be properly developed. 
The Conservative-Traditionalist canon of Spain is the concept of nation 
competing with liberal thought. It also has its early formulation in the „War of 
Independence‟, when defenders of the Ancien Régime defined the Spanish nation as 
intrinsically Catholic and mobilised the population to fight the „atheist invader‟. 
Absolutists, and latterly Carlists, considered liberal ideas „Anti-Spanish‟ and against 
the country‟s „traditions‟. These alleged „traditions‟ were in fact a modern invention 
of the reactionary forces, copied from the traditionalist discourse elaborated in France 
during the Revolution, but the anti-liberal rhetoric was widely used as an ideological 
tool to defend the privileges of the Church and the Crown (Herrero, 1973). It was not, 
however, until the second half of the nineteenth century that reactionary thinkers 
realised the potent appeal of nationalism, and the traditionalist version of the patria 
was fully elaborated by Catholic historians such as Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo. In 
this model, Catholic unity was the common denominator of the foundation of Spanish 
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nationality which legitimised the monarchy as the national political institution par 
excellence. Traditionalist historians explained the pinnacle of Spanish power in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a consequence of the struggle against „foreign 
heresy‟ in Europe and the evangelisation of the Americas. They also blamed French 
rationalism for the artificial introduction of revolutionary ideas that supposedly 
destroyed the unity of Spanish culture. Contrary to the liberal-progressive model, 
traditionalists found the Spanish Golden Age in the time of the first Habsburgs and 
blamed Bourbon reformism for the nation‟s decadence. Their redemptive ideal was a 
community politically and religiously united, led by a strong Crown and an 
independent Catholic Church. 
This traditionalist concept was essentially ethnic. It emphasised a common 
religious culture as the Volkgeist of the nation and left virtually no space to „civic‟ 
political rights. Needless to say, this theocratic and romantic conception of the nation 
was adopted by all those traditionalist groups opposed to the liberal state, such as the 
Carlists, the Catholic Integrists, and significant sectors of the Catholic hierarchy 
(Álvarez Junco, 2001). Concerning the state structure, the traditionalists advocated a 
decentralised Spain, where regions would maintain their medieval privileges. The 
restoration of the Ancien Régime would thus entail the reinstatement of old territorial 
charts and statutes. This in turn would signal a return to the nation‟s Golden Era 
(Núñez, 1999). In opposition to liberal centralisation and throughout the nineteenth 
century, the defence of the fueros increasingly became a propaganda tool to mobilise 
support for the traditionalist cause, gaining significant success in the rural areas of 
Navarre, the Basque Country, and Catalonia. 
During the Restoration (1874-1923), the right-wing of the Conservative party 
defended a very similar ethnic pattern of the Spanish nation, within the liberal 
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monarchic system. Antonio Cánovas, architect of the Restoration system and 
Conservative leader, conceived of nations as biological organisms with their own 
„national character‟ shaped through the centuries by tradition and culture. This 
historicist-romantic conception did not completely rule out the liberal idea of a shared 
will and communal consciousness in the formation of nations, but it certainly gave 
more importance to divine determination. Beyond all geographical, cultural, racial 
and linguistic aspects, nations were „God‟s acts‟, declared Cánovas in 1882 (Vilar, 
1984). Unlike the traditionalists, however, these sectors of the Right were strongly 
unitarian. Following the moderate-liberals‟ route, they bid for the end of medieval 
regional privileges and attempted to unify legislation and centralise the state 
administration during the last quarter of the century.  
Throughout the nineteenth century these two versions of Spanish nationalism 
– the liberal and the traditionalist - framed their discourses, incorporating both civic 
and ethnic features. They were also divided into different groups, not so much due to 
a conflicting concept of the nation but because of the territorial state framework they 
advocated. Liberals certainly emphasised civic over ethnic characters in their 
„construction‟ of the patria, but the split between federalists and centralists shows that 
two different views on state structure can emerge out of a similar perception of the 
nation. The traditionalist version stressed one cultural factor, Catholicism, as the 
essence of the Spanish Volksgeist, and yet the political factor of the monarchy as the 
institution that had historically „created‟ the political community remained. Again, the 
main differences between traditionalist branches responded to the territorial 
organisation of the state, fluctuating between Carlist regionalism and conservative 
centralisation.  
 10 
 
 
Spanish Nationalisms vs. Peripheral Nationalisms, 1898-1975 
 
During the twentieth century, Spanish nationalism continued to fluctuate 
between liberal and traditionalist conceptions of the nation. This time, however, the 
two traditions gradually galvanized the state into becoming a counter-force against 
peripheral nationalist parties (Pozo Andrés & Braster, 1999).  
By 1898, the nationalisms of the Basque Country and Catalonia had emerged 
as alternative sources of national identity and threatened the hegemonic position of 
Spanish nationalism. Three main factors explain the emergence of Basque and 
Catalan nationalisms at the turn of the century. Firstly, the fraudulent political system 
established by the Restoration (1875-1923), in which the liberal and conservative 
parties took office in turns, alienated large sectors of Spanish society. In an age of 
mass politics in which Spain was becoming a modern nation, the Restoration was an 
inadequate system to express new political concerns. Secondly, the process of rapid 
industrialization in Catalonia and the Basque Country in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century led to profound socio-economic transformations, with a significant 
flow of Castilian immigrants into these regions and the subsequent ethnicist reaction 
of the local lower-middle classes which considered their „traditional‟ way of life 
under threat. Thirdly, after the 1898 „disaster‟, Spain not only lost its colonies (Cuba, 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines) but the opportunity to engage the masses in the 
imperial project –following the pattern established by the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany. Hence, the rise of Basque and Catalan political nationalisms, which 
had been preceded by periods of cultural revival, can be seen as a reaction to the 
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Restoration system and the failure of Spanish elites to incorporate all sectors of 
society into the national ideal (Corcuera, 2001; Riquer, 1994; Ucelay, 1995). 
Parallel to the emergence of peripheral nationalisms, liberal intellectuals 
proposed the „regeneration‟ of Spain. The idea of national regeneration was certainly 
not invented at the turn of the century, but during the 1890s and especially after the 
military defeat in Cuba and the Philippines, cultural elites steadily propagated the 
need of a national rebirth. During the 25 years that followed the loss of the Empire, 
the so-called Generation of 98, which included figures such as Miguel de Unamuno 
and Joaquín Costa, and later the Generation of 14, led by the philosopher José Ortega 
y Gasset, sought to identify the essence of the Spanish national character. Their goal 
was to explain contemporary reality through an understanding of the national 
character and ultimately provide practical solutions for Spanish regeneration.  
Despite the diversity of analyses and conclusions, it is possible to discern 
some common traits in the regenerationist discourse. Firstly, it conceived of the nation 
as an organic whole that had to be understood as an evolutionary progress. This view 
combined romantic German historicism and new currents of vitalism, but it was also 
steeped in Social Darwinist postulates and geographical determinism, so much in 
vogue in fin-de-siècle Europe. Secondly, it highlighted the centrality of Castile in the 
historical formation of the nation in the Middle Ages and Castilian as the national 
language; and yet advocated the regeneration of the municipalities and local life as the 
starting point of national reconstruction. On the one hand, these postulates challenged 
the Restoration centralist system, which was considered inefficient and guilty of 
destroying the „popular national life‟ (Fox, 1997). On the other, regenerationists 
criticised the emerging Catalan and Basque nationalism as artificial, bourgeois, and 
backward looking. They denounced the peripheral middle-classes for turning to 
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regionalist and nationalist movements, labelling them selfish and reactionary, but 
usually held the oligarchic system of the Restoration ultimately responsible for the 
emergence of the „separatist‟ ideas (Storm, 1998). In doing so, the regenerationists 
significantly contributed to the growth of a new Spanish nationalism, as well as to the 
nascent dialectic between Spanish and peripheral nationalism which dominated the 
twentieth century. 
 This was a nationalism which sought to modernise Spain via industrialization, 
social reform and democratisation. The „Europeanization‟ of Spain became the main 
aim: the country had to open itself to modern trends and catch up with western 
nations. This transformation, however, had to be undertaken in perfect harmony with 
the geographical peculiarities of Spain and, above all, with the spiritual character and 
psychology of the people. This illustrates a twofold tendency in which the desire of 
modernisation was combined with the need to deepen the nation‟s past to find the 
„popular spirit‟ that had survived through the centuries (Serrano, 1998). 
Regenerationism was a civic nationalism in which the idea of a community unified by 
a common democratic law remained essential. Yet it differed from the previous 
liberal-progressive nationalism in its deep historicism and vitalism, which signalled 
the overcoming of positivist tendencies that had dominated the thought of nineteenth 
century democrats.  
 The first decades of the twentieth century also witnessed a profound evolution 
of the conservative-traditionalist canon of Spain, which incorporated Castilian 
language, previously a liberal feature of Spanishness, into its ideological repertoire. In 
fact, the development of peripheral nationalism produced a reaction from different 
right-wing groups which favoured the emergence of a new authoritarian, anti-liberal, 
Catholic, and centralist Spanish nationalism. One of the key social groups in the re-
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elaboration of the conservative canon of Spain were professional army officers, who 
developed a new military nationalism combining regenerationist tenets with 
traditional Spanish nationalism and who advocated an authoritarian state as a means 
to modernise the country (Balfour, 1996). This new authoritarian canon of Spain 
became official in September 1923, when the Captain General of Barcelona, Miguel 
Primo de Rivera, ousted the liberal regime via military coup, invoking the „separatist 
threat‟, the inefficient parliamentary system, and the actions of organised labour. With 
the support of the King, radical sectors of the Conservative Party, the Church, and the 
army, the primorriveristas postulated a monarchist ultra-catholic idea of the nation, in 
which religion, the Castilian language and the common imperial past represented 
essences of the Spanish people. Following authoritarian currents rising at the time in 
Europe, particularly Fascism, Primo and his ideologues attempted to build a new 
corporatist and centralist state, which could integrate social classes and regional 
identities under the authoritarian national ideal, later known during Francoism as 
National-Catholicism (Quiroga, 2000). 
The primorriverista ethnicist drive sought to combat the rise of peripheral 
nationalisms with pro-Castilian linguistic policies, in an attempt to deprive peripheral 
nationalists of their cultural appeal among Basque and Catalan speakers. However, 
government repression did not bring about the desired effect. Indeed, it led to the 
reinforcement of peripheral nationalist tendencies in the 1920s. In the Basque 
Country, a fragmented nationalist community withdrew from the political scene and 
devoted its efforts to „cultural regeneration‟ in anticipation of a political opportunity. 
With the fall of Primo de Rivera in 1930, the two existing parties fused into the 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and Basque nationalism ceased to appear as radical 
and romantic as in its early years. Many in the middle classes began to see Basque 
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nationalism as the most effective means of defending their interests and „way of life‟. 
In Catalonia, different nationalist factions also came together in their struggle against 
the dictatorship and cultural production in the Catalan language increased, while 
democratic republican Catalan tendencies gained mass support (Granja et. al., 2001). 
More importantly, after the fall of the dictator, Spanish liberals, republicans, and 
socialists reached a political agreement with peripheral nationalists to establish a 
secular, democratic and decentralised republic. The failure of the more authoritarian 
Spanish nationalism in dealing with peripheral nationalism paved the way for a non-
centralist re-evaluation of the liberal-democratic version of Spain. 
With the advent of the Second Republic in 1931 Spanish liberals and socialists 
tried to find a solution to the regionalist question through measures of state 
decentralisation. The views of liberal and republican intellectuals, such as José Ortega 
y Gasset and Manuel Azaña, dominated political discourse on the subject. This was an 
essentially civic discourse, which identified the Spanish people as a democratic 
political community defined by a common body of law. Yet certain cultural 
determinism can also be detected in the republicans‟ idea of the patria, for Spanish 
unity was understood in historical, linguistic, and cultural terms. Nevertheless, 
republicans and socialists acknowledged the existence of particular cultures and 
contemplated home-rule statutes for those areas where nationalist sentiments were 
strong, seeking their accommodation within the structure of the Spanish state. Hence 
the 1931 Constitution proposed the creation of an „integral‟ state, an alternative 
framework that maintained the Spanish people as the sole national sovereign, while 
allowing the creation of home rule statutes in certain regions. Catalonia obtained her 
home-rule statute in 1932 and the Basque Country in October 1936. It was too late. 
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On July 18 that year, a military rebellion against the Republic led to the Spanish Civil 
War (1936-39) and the Basque statute was never fully developed. 
The Civil War was not a fight between Spanish nationalism and peripheral 
nationalism, but there are few doubts that the military rebels saw the development of 
home rule statutes as a direct threat for the unity of the fatherland. During Franco‟s 
dictatorship (1939-1975), the „conservative-traditionalist‟ version of Spanish 
nationalism became dominant in the shape of National Catholicism, an ideological 
blend of Fascist, Carlist, Neo-Traditionalist and military principles (Saz, 2003). After 
his victory in the war, Franco imposed a military, proto-fascist, and ultramontane 
canon of Spain, representing Catholicism as the essence of Spain, and emphasising 
Castile as the „ethnic core‟ of the nation. Consonant with its totalitarian aspirations, 
Franco‟s regime systematically repressed those political opponents who challenged 
National-Catholicism. The Basque and Catalan home-rule statutes were abolished and 
a new state was built on legal, administrative, and territorial centralism. Moreover, the 
dictatorship steadily applied policies of cultural assimilation: Spanish was declared 
the only official language, and particular signs of regional identities (e. g. languages, 
flags, and anthems) were banned and persecuted.   
 Franco‟s ethnic concept of the nation went hand in hand with the idea of 
national regeneration. Not only did the Francoist propaganda rewrite the Civil War as 
a „crusade‟, it re-elaborated the image of the „Anti-Spain‟, a mythological figure 
which incorporated liberals, republicans, leftists, and peripheral nationalists - all 
portrayed as the „cancer‟ of the nation. According to the regime‟s ideologues, that 
„disease‟ had to be „cured‟ by „creative and purifying‟ violence (Richards, 1998). 
However, the regime‟s dependency on violence provoked a violent reaction from a 
new generation of nationalists. In 1959, ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna; Basque 
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Country and Freedom) started its war of „national liberation‟ against Spain. ETA‟s 
ideology was a mixture of radical Basque nationalism and Marxist rhetoric which 
borrowed elements of Third World liberation movements. ETA‟s violent 
confrontation led to fierce repression from the Francoist regime, which, in turn, 
invigorated popular Basque consciousness in what came to be known as the action-
repression-action spiral, and served as a unifying factor not only among Basque 
nationalists but also Spanish leftists, democrats and Catalan nationalists (Jáuregui 
1986). The Catalan opposition to Francoism was radically different to that in the 
Basque Country. During the 1960s and early 1970s, political opposition to the 
dictatorship was accompanied by a cultural revival in literature, art, and music, which 
fostered Catalan national identity. Furthermore, Catalan nationalists joined forces 
with communists, socialists and liberals to fight against the dictatorship, much in the 
same manner they had done before the proclamation of the II Republic.  
Thus the same historical pattern as at the beginning of the century is to be 
observed in the period of the Second Republic and Francoism. The political 
achievements of peripheral nationalisms brought a dictatorial reaction from Spanish 
conservative nationalism, which attempted to suppress Catalan and Basque 
nationalism through political and cultural repression. This repression, in turn, fostered 
peripheral nationalisms, which gained broader popular support, allied with the 
Spanish left and liberals in their opposition against the dictatorship. By the death of 
Franco in 1975, the idea of a democratic Spain had become associated, once again, 
with decentralisation and home rule for Catalonia and the Basque Country.  
 To sum up, in the period 1898-1975 two different discourses of Spanish 
nationalism, „liberal-democratic‟ and „catholic-traditionalist‟, became discursive 
backbones of different political systems. Firstly, liberal-democratic Spanish 
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nationalism was briefly exercised during the Second Republic and aimed at 
integrating, rather than excluding, the different nations through institutional reforms 
such as devolution. Second, the „catholic-traditionalist‟ form of nationalism was 
implemented during the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Franco. These regimes 
were characterised by their defence of an ethnic concept of Spain (religious and 
linguistic) and their centralist and authoritarian policies. Attempts to suppress 
peripheral nationalisms through political and cultural repression, however, had a 
contrary effect to that pursued. The denial of Basque and Catalan national identities 
fostered peripheral nationalism, which gained broader popular support.  
 
 
Democracy and the Reformulation of the Dialectic, 1975-2004 
 
During the Spanish transition to democracy (1975-1978), there was an upsurge 
in support for political autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque Country, as a reaction 
to the authoritarian Spanish nationalism imposed during four decades.  Unlike the 
1930s, however, demands for regional autonomy did not limit themselves to 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, but spread all across 
Spain. Regions like Andalusia, Aragon, Valencia, Asturias, or the Canary Islands 
expressed diverse levels of regional identity and claimed their own political power 
within a decentralized state. This generalization of regional political demands shows 
the degree to which the idea of a democratic Spain had been associated with 
decentralization to the discredit of National Catholicism. From 1976 onwards it 
seemed clear that the state would have to rest on two pillars: parliamentary democracy 
and regional autonomy (Clark & Haltzel, 1987).  
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The 1978 Constitution was a compromise between very diverse political 
forces attempting to find a political solution to the national question in Spain. The 
Constitution sought to reconcile the centre-periphery tension throughout the text. 
Article 2 advocated „the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation‟ while it also 
recognised and guaranteed „the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of 
which it is composed‟. Regarding language, Castilian was declared the „official 
language of the state‟, but „other Spanish languages shall be official in their respective 
Autonomous Communities‟ (Article 3.). The word „nation‟ was, however, reserved 
for the Spanish as a whole while Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia were 
considered „historic nationalities‟. Under the new arrangement, Catalonia, the Basque 
Country and Galicia obtained their own Statutes of Autonomy and, throughout the 
1980s, the example was followed by all regions in Spain, bringing the number of 
autonomous communities up to 17. 
The 1978 Constitution differs from that of 1931 in that the latter mainly dealt 
with Catalan nationalism and did not attempt a deep transformation of the state‟s 
territorial structure. The 1978 text, by contrast, deals with Catalan, Basque and 
Galician ethno-national differences, while attempting to restructure Spain as a quasi-
federal state. A State of Autonomies (Estado de las Autonomías), replaced the 
centralised structure of the state. The Constitution, and its continuation in the 1981 
Law of Autonomic Harmonisation (LOAPA), allowed all regions to have their own 
parliament and decision-making process. As a result of the implementation of the 
autonomic model, and the concomitant establishment of political and cultural bodies 
devoted to fostering regional distinctiveness, national and regional identities tend to 
overlap in most of the population. Nowadays, up to 50% of Spaniards identify 
 19 
themselves equally with their region and Spain while only 26% consider the region or 
Spain more important than the other (Moral, 1998).  
Spanish nationalists‟ reaction to the new constitutional settlement was mixed. 
While the vast majority of political parties participated in the drafting of the new 
Magna Carta, a minority of die-hard Francoists opposed it and used the army to 
reinstate the National Catholic canon of Spain. The 1981 military coup-d’etat was the 
last attempt to restore a centralist and authoritarian regime, and its failure signalled 
the end of National Catholicism as a political option. Although the immediate cause 
that triggered the coup was ETA‟s political violence, which frequently targeted army 
and police officers, further reasons behind the military coup were the alleged dangers 
democracy and devolution posed for the unity of the fatherland. Yet the military coup 
backfired. It not only led to the consolidation of the democratic regime and fostered 
territorial decentralization, but completely cleared the electoral landscape of extreme 
right parties. After the coup, the conservative Prime Minister, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, 
and the leader of the socialist opposition, Felipe González, reached an agreement to 
rationalize and advance the process of devolution, in an attempt to conciliate regional 
demands and strengthen the new constitutional system.   
Despite these threats to Spanish democracy, the constitutional order was 
consolidated during the early 1980s. The Socialist party, in power from 1982 to 1996, 
promoted a discourse of state modernization as a means to reinforce democracy, 
which intentionally downplayed references to the Spanish nation. This discourse 
rested on two main pillars: the creation of a decentralised state and the integration of 
Spain into the European Economic Community (EEC). Regarding the former, the 
progressive implementation of the statutes of autonomy showed the viability of a 
decentralised state. Additionally, the entrance of Spain into the EEC in 1986 became 
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the hallmark of the Spanish left‟s Europeanist „vocation‟ and the acknowledgment of 
the country‟s transformation since 1975. Spain was no longer regarded as a backward 
looking and authoritarian state but as a modern, secular and European country.  
In a sense, Spain‟s inclusion in the process of European integration has to be 
seen as the culmination of a long project of Europeanisation of a country defended by 
liberal and democratic Spanish nationalists ever since the crisis of 1898. During the 
1980s and 1990s, both socialists and communists slowly „rediscovered‟ the historical 
legacy of the Spanish „civic‟ nationalism in the figures of intellectuals and politicians 
like Ortega y Gasset and Azaña. Although the approaches to the territorial 
organization of the state ranged from federalism to the improvement of the current 
State of the Autonomies, the Left continually emphasised the idea of solidarity among 
the regions and defended its loyalty to the 1978 Constitution as main elements of its 
discourse. From this perspective, Spain was a „nation of nations‟ in which different 
cultures and languages could live together under the same Constitution (Núñez, 
1999). 
Following a very different political transformation, the Spanish right also 
ended up defending a similar national pattern during the 1990s. The Spanish 
conservative party (Partido Popular, PP), which had inherited the Francoist tradition 
of  Alianza Popular (AP), reformed itself to present a moderate programme of liberal 
Spanish nationalism. From its initial opposition to the development of statutes of 
autonomy in the early 1980s, the conservative party changed to full acceptance of the 
1978 Constitution as the only possible political framework for Spain. The Right also 
partially set aside its providential view of the nation inherited from National 
Catholicism, recovered the intellectual heritage of the regenerationists of the first third 
of the twentieth Century, and presented Spain as a modern European and multicultural 
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nation.
 
This view defined Spain as the only nation in the Spanish state and established 
a dialectical struggle with peripheral nationalists, who conceived Spain as a mere state 
and Catalonia and the Basque Country as the real nations integrated in it. (Vidal 
Quadras, 1997).  
Therefore, nowadays it is possible to detect, both in the Right and the Left, a 
renovated Spanish nationalism, which has retaken the legacy of early twentieth 
century liberal-democratic nationalism and describes itself as modern, civic, plural, 
and European, challenging the „ethnic‟ peripheral nationalisms of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. Rhetorically, this new nationalism heavily relies on Jürgen 
Habermas‟ concept of „constitutional patriotism‟, which defends the idea of 
citizenship-based universal civic principles rather than a shared culture. For Spanish 
constitutional patriots, Spain is a multicultural nation politically bounded by a 
„democratic contract‟, as established by the 1978 Constitution. And it is loyalty to this 
legal text that guarantees the necessary civic consensus among Spaniards.
iv
 This new 
Spanish nationalism has endowed itself with certain symbols and policies attached to 
its idea of the Spanish nation. The concept of the Crown as the historical unifying 
element in the history of Spain, the defence of the Castilian language in Catalonia and 
the Basque Country (where Castilian is seen to be increasingly marginalized), and the 
attempt to establish of a common inter-regional curriculum in History and Social 
Sciences for the whole of Spain, are just some examples of these manifestations of 
Spanish nationalism. A special mention should be made here of King Juan Carlos I, 
who has become a symbol of democracy since he publicly defended the constitutional 
order against the military coup in 1981. The Monarchy is today the most respected 
institution and critiques of the King are almost non-existent.
v 
Nevertheless, the factor 
that most contributed to the consolidation of this „civic nationalism‟ during the 1990s 
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has been ETA‟s political violence. Since Francoism, the Basque armed group has 
hardly evolved in its political discourse (which holds the Basques are an oppressed 
nation and need violence to liberate themselves) and has increasingly used terrorist 
tactics. The reaction from Basque and Spanish civil society against terrorism has 
reinforced Spanish national identity as democratic, presenting ETA as Spain‟s main 
problem.
vi
 Spanish conservatives and socialists have sought to channel this social 
contempt for political violence. For example, the anti-terrorist pact signed by PP and 
PSOE in December 2000 emphasized the 1978 Constitution and the Basque Statute of 
Autonomy as the political framework in which the terrorist question had to be solved, 
and presented ETA as the greatest enemy of Spanish democracy. 
For all the exclusively civic character this new Spanish nationalism claims, the 
record suggests that some ethnic elements lie underneath the constitutional patriots‟ 
version of Spain. The need to present Spain as a unique historical and cultural 
community, endorsing the political community, remains a foundation on which to 
justify the existence of the Spanish nation well before the 1978 Constitution. The key 
here is to be found in the Constitutional patriots‟ re-discovery of early twentieth-
century Spanish nationalists, most specifically the figure of José Ortega y Gasset. 
Ortega‟s liberal idea of Spain was never detached from a certain historical 
determinism, ultimately portraying the Spanish nation as the product of History 
(Bastida, 1997). Although often concealed or implicit, the same historical 
determinism can be detected in the moderate leftists‟ concept of Spain. In their eyes, 
Spain is a „nation of nations‟, but, within this plurality, there is a single sovereignty 
and a collective project for the whole community, which existence is legitimised by a 
common history. As Xosé M. Núñez Seixas has pointed out, this necessity to appeal 
to a common and pre-constitutional past indicates the impossibility of creating a pure 
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civic patriotism, exclusively based on loyalty to the constitutional text and completely 
devoid of historical and cultural elements (Núñez, 2001).  
Cultural and historical endorsement of the civic idea of Spain has been even 
blunter in the conservative political discourse. While defending a multicultural Spain, 
the creation of the nation was dated to the Fifteenth Century, when the marriage of 
Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon assembled both crowns, and common 
historical enterprises such as the colonization of the Americas endowed the Spanish 
peoples with a shared past on which future common enterprises could be based 
(Aznar, 1995).  Some of the policies implemented by the PP government have shown 
the implications behind this concept of nation. Special attention was paid to the 
promotion of Castilian language in schools, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country where regional governments‟ linguistic policies of  „Catalanization‟ and 
„Basquization‟ were regarded as an attack on Spanish speakers. The teaching of 
history also became part of the political battleground. By incorporating common 
topics of Spanish history into the syllabus, the central government reforms of the 
history curriculum sought to prevent the so-called „regional atomisation‟ of the 
teaching of history (Pérez et. al., 2001).  
Moreover, the Right slowly revived the religious element as a component of 
Spanish national identity. In 1997, for instance, the state-funded Royal Academy of 
History published a collective book, which defended a primordialist vision of Spain 
and presented Christianity at the core of the nation‟s historical formation (Benito, 
1997). PP proposals for imposing  -Catholic- religion as a compulsory subject in 
public schools‟ curriculum and increasing state funding of private religious schools, 
properly exemplified the growing conservative trend of emphasising Catholicism as a 
component of national identity. The conservative central government‟s immigration 
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policies also displayed a certain „ethnic concern‟ based on their idea of Spain. The PP 
government authorised the entrance of one million Latin American immigrants due to 
Spain‟s economic necessity of cheap labour. Religious and linguistic affinity 
prevailed here over the most immediate choice that would have been North-African 
workers, a community considered more difficult to assimilate than Spanish speaking 
Americans.
vii
  
 
It is therefore evident that constitutional patriotism is a neo-Spanish 
nationalism essentially, but not completely, civic. Cultural features remain important 
in both discourse and policies, ranging from historical determinism to the recovery of 
ethnic factors, such as language and religion. Furthermore, although socialists and 
conservatives have reached an effective consensus in the defence of the Constitution 
and the Statutes of Autonomy, as a result of their dialectic confrontation with 
peripheral nationalists willing to modify the constitutional framework, the old 
divisions between the two models of Spanish nationalism re-emerge in times of 
political crisis. For example, in March 2003, when the conservative government was 
facing a vast social mobilisation against the war in Iraq, PP leaders resumed the pre-
civil war discourse of the existence of two antagonist Spains and accused socialists, 
communists and peripheral nationalists of being “anti-Spanish”, much in the same 
manner as the authoritarian Right did throughout the twentieth century.
viii
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This article has shown that a pervasive feature of Spanish nationalisms in the 
last two centuries has been the combination of ethnic and civic components in the 
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concept of nation. Moreover, the emphasis on ethnic or civil features in Spanish 
nationalist discourses has changed depending on political circumstances. The 
conservative canon has tended to highlight ethnic elements and liberal nationalism has 
emphasised civic factors. Yet no model of Spanish nationalism has historically been 
either purely ethnic or civic. The need to justify the existence of a political 
community based on a common history, has forced civic nationalism to incorporate 
cultural elements to its discourse. At the same time, the requirement of granting the 
cultural community a political form, makes the incorporation of certain civil features 
unavoidable for ethnic nationalism. During the nineteenth century, the evolving nature 
of Spanish national identity can be understood following the different liberal and 
traditionalist‟s conceptions of Spain, in terms of both the ethnic-civic divide and their 
proposals for state territorial organisation. The emergence of peripheral nationalist 
movements at the turn of the twentieth century introduced a new variant into the 
Spanish nationalist discourse that led to further changes in the concept of Spanish 
nation. The conservative canon went through a process of further ethnicization, 
adopting previously liberal features such as the promotion of the Castilian language 
and radicalising Catholic bigotry as hallmarks of national identity. The liberal idea of 
Spain, in turn, increasingly adopted a democratic and multicultural nature, in an 
historical process that had much to do with the opposition to the National Catholic 
canon and the political alliances progressive forces reached with peripheral 
nationalists during authoritarian periods.  
The 1978 constitutional arrangement has led to an increasing consensus on the 
democratic nature of the Spanish nation and the decentralized structure of the state. 
The changing nature of modern Spanish nationalism can be seen in its acceptance of 
the different cultural and national groups within Spain and in its self-portrayal as an 
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example of „civic‟ nationalism - in clear opposition to the „ethnic‟ peripheral 
nationalisms. Yet this does not signal the end of the dialectic Spanish nationalism 
versus peripheral nationalisms, let alone the disappearance of Spanish nationalism. As 
we have seen, this new nationalism is not entirely civic and incorporates historical 
determinism and cultural features in its definition of Spain.   
New challenges in the twenty-first century, already latent during the 1990s, are 
likely to change further the political discourse of both Spanish and peripheral 
nationalists and therefore, to reformulate the very nature of their relationship. The 
new role of the nation-state in an increasingly interconnected world, the 
transformation of the European Union, Islamic fundamentalism and, above all, the 
impact of non-European immigration in Spain, are contemporary issues that will lead 
to the re-shaping of national identities in the Iberian Peninsula. Whether this 
transformation of national identities will take an ethnic or civic drive is difficult to 
determine. 
The supremacy of the civic elements over the ethnic ones in the Constitutional 
Patriotic discourse is by no means guaranteed for the future. Further research on this 
area will have to deal with the epistemological problem of distinguishing between the 
more communal expressions of Spanishness and the more institutional and associative 
aspects, together with the changing nature of Spanish nationalism in an increasingly 
interconnected world. In all cases, both the civic and ethnic trends are likely to remain 
relevant in the evolving discourse of Spanish nationalism. 
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i
 Ortega y Gasset ([1914] 1999), pp. 72. 
ii
 A first article, by Juan Pablo Fusi, argued that it was the failure of the Spanish nationalist project to 
incorporate the peripheral nationalist elites that produced the birth and development of nationalism in 
various regions in Spain, namely Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. An opposing view, held 
by Borja de Riquer, argued that the reason why the Spanish nationalist project did not succeed was that 
it did not take into account other pre-existing forms of identity. See Borja de Riquer (1990) and Fusi 
(1990 a; 1990 b). Prior to the debate between Fusi and De Riquer, scholars had paid little attention to 
the topic of Spanish nationalism. During the 1980s, the few works on the subject were those of José 
María Jover Zamora (1984), Paloma Cirujano et. al. (1985) and Andrés de Blas Guerrero (1989). 
iii
 3 For a view of Spanish nationalism as inflexible see Letamendía (2000). For a view in which 
Spanish nationalism is „given‟ see Linz (1973). 
iv
 For the official PP‟s postulates on constitutional patriotism see Pique and San Gil‟s “El patriotismo 
constitucional del siglo XXI”. Paper presented to the conservative party congress in January 2002. 
v
 The Spanish Penal Code punishes mocks, calumnies, and injuries against the Crown and the use of 
the king‟s image to damage royal prestige (Art. 490 and 491). The media is very careful with the 
treatment given to the royal family and it is guided by a strong and self-imposed code of conduct. 
vi
 According to an opinion poll conducted by the United Nations in June 2001, terrorism was the main 
social problem for 67% of Spaniards. Immigration was also considered a problematic issue by 21% of 
the population, in a sharp contrast with the polls in 1996, which showed only 2% of Spaniards worried 
about immigration. El País, Madrid, 29-6-2001. 
vii
 In the same vein, José María Aznar joined the Vatican and Ireland in demanding a mention to 
Europe‟s ‟Christian roots‟ in the preamble of the European constitution showing the will to emphasise 
religious elements when defining political communities and, as in the case of Spain, to draw a cultural 
and historical line between the Christian and the Muslim worlds. 
viii
 See, for instance, the comments of Jaime Mayor Oreja, in El País, 31-3-2003. 
